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Changes to the first run wizard

By , February 15, 2018 2:41 pm

When you run one of our tools for the first time it displays the first run wizard.

The first run wizard takes you through the steps of configuring a few settings that are important to the tool your a using. Most of these settings are the same for each tool, although some of the first run wizards have settings pages that are specific to that tool.

We’ve just add a new page to the first run wizard. We’ve added the ability to configure the behaviour of the launch, inject and wait dialogs. The default behaviour is wizard. The behaviour can be modified from the Settings menu (formerly, Configure menu). Now this setting can also be set on the first run wizard.

The reason for adding this option to the first run wizard is because when we’ve done interactive debugging with customers we often notice that the user still has their Validator configured to use the launch wizard, rather than the more concise launch dialog. We thought there was a chance that some people don’t realise they can change the style of these dialogs/wizards.


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New tools and old tools

By , February 6, 2018 11:16 am

Last week we released a versions of our tools that no longer install DLLs in the Windows system32 directory. We documented these changes in an article Changing How We Install Our Software.

In hindsight, I think we rushed that release. Which is a strange thing to write given that the work that went into it was nearly a month in duration and the last two weeks of testing every use case for the update NT Service API and the new DLL locations, that was very detailed and deliberate.

But where we let ourselves down was how we communicated about how the old versions of the tools and the new versions of the tools can live side by side. This blog post is about clearing up any misunderstanding. We’ve also improved the user interface for informing you about the old DLLs and choosing what action to take if old DLLs are found.

How do old tools and new tools co-exist?

Old Tools. The old tools always copy the DLLs they need to System32 every time they start. Because of this, even if a new tool removes the DLLs, the old tools will reinstall the DLLs automatically.

New tools. The new tools don’t expect to find DLLs in System32 and thus may not work correctly if DLLs are found there (because of how Windows search paths work). To deal with this we’ve provided a helper utility system32 cleanup which you can use to automatically delete any DLLs from old tools.

If you set the cleanup utility to automatically delete any dlls from old tools, then the new tools will always cleanup any dlls from the old tools, while the old tools will always replace them. This system will work unless you have an anti-virus tool that starts deleting anything copied into System32 – if that is happening you need to start using the new versions of our tools.

System32 Cleanup

The system32 cleanup user interface is only displayed if there are DLLs from old versions of the tools in the Windows system32 directory.

Please note that on 64 bit machines the 32 bit versions of our tools will be looking in SysWow64 (although the path will be reported as system32 due to the Windows file redirection mechanism).

We’ve replaced the message box with a dedicated dialog that allows you to choose how you want the old DLLs treated.


The dialog provides a list of DLLs that are from old versions of our software tools.

Below the list is a combo box allowing you to choose what action is taken when any subsequent check for DLLs is run (regardless of which Validator tool starts the check for old DLLs). The options are:

  • Always ask to delete files.
  • Always delete files.
  • Never delete files.

Each option results in different behaviour.

Always Ask To Delete Files

If Software Verify DLLs are found in system32 the dialog is displayed. The user of the software gets to choose if the DLLs are deleted or not. The DLLs can be deleted by clicking the Delete Files button. The future behaviour of the dialog can be changed by choosing one of the options in the combo box. If Always delete files is chosen the DLLs will be deleted when the dialog is closed.

Always Delete Files

If Software Verify DLLs are found in system32 the DLLs are deleted without informing the user. The dialog is never displayed.

Never Delete Files

No DLLs are deleted. The dialog is never displayed.

/reset

Because only one of the above behaviours results in the dialog being displayed it is possible to set the dialog up so that you can never interact with it again. But what if you wanted to change the behaviour once later on? To do that, run the svlSystem32Cleanup.exe (or svlSystem32Cleanup_x64.exe as appropriate) with the /reset command line argument. This will reset the behaviour to the default state and cause the user interface to display even if there are no DLLs to delete.

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Changing how we install our software

By , February 3, 2018 10:46 am

With the next release of our software (later today) we are changing how we install our software.

The installers stay the same, the software (as you see it) stays the same, but under the hood, things are different. This article describes that change, why we made that change, the consequences of that change, and the work we did to ensure the software keeps functioning.

First, some history.

System32

Once upon a time, software developers routinely placed their DLLs in the Windows system directory, and then when Windows 95 came along, they placed their DLLs in the Windows system32 directory. This eventually resulted in a mess, as far too many DLLs from different software vendors ended up stored in one place.

To solve this Microsoft stated that an application’s DLLs should be stored with the application. Microsoft also made installing their redistributables easier and made various other changes that made “DLL Hell” go away (or manifest in subtly different forms). Over time most software vendors changed how they distributed their software.

Debugging Tools

When we started Software Verify Limited (originally as Software Verification Limited, which no-one could spell!), we noticed that for certain types of problem we needed to investigate, it was quite hard to get the appropriate DLLs to load into the target application unless the DLLs were stored in the system32 directory.

We took the view, rightly or wrongly, that because we were providing tools that do unusual things with applications we could also do non-standard things with how we installed the software. We also added code to the user interface so that each time it started it would copy it’s DLLs to where it thought they needed to be (usually system32, sometimes SysWow64 – the 32 bit system32 on a 64 bit machine).

This behaviour was so ingrained and so core to how the software worked, that even when we spent 3 months rewriting the software many years ago to work nicely in the administrator mode enabled world of Windows Vista/7/8/10, it never occurred to us to change our abuse of the system32 directory.

Anti-Virus

Then one day, a developer researching our tools emailed us saying that he liked our tools but he was constantly fighting his anti-virus tool (BitDefender) that was flagging our tools as viruses because we copied files into the Windows system32 directory. He had disabled this feature but really wanted our software modifying so that we didn’t trigger the Anti-Virus software.

We’d also had reports from other developers that other anti-virus tools had flagged our tools as viruses – which we had assumed was a reference to the fact that our software uses CreateRemoteThread(). The function CreateRemoteThread() can be used for good and for ill. The Toolhelp and PSAPI libraries use this function to query data from running executables. So does Process Explorer from SysInternals (now part of Microsoft). We also use it. So do Bad Guys ™.

These various reports indicated to us that we had a problem, so we started investigating what needed to change to get the many moving parts of our software to work correctly without us touching Windows system32 or Windows sysWow64.

The change to what we install

Things we don’t do any more:

  • We no longer install any Software Verify DLLs or EXEs to system32 or sysWow64.
  • We no longer copy any Software Verify DLLs or EXEs to system32 or sysWow64 when the user interface runs.

So how do the DLLs get found?

One solution to this would be to place the path to the installed tool in the PATH environment variable. We considered this for a short while. But we have a lot of tools and the paths to them will be long if stored in the default location of c:\program files etc. We didn’t like the idea of someone installing C++ Developer Suite x64 / x86 and suddenly being faced with 8 new, very long paths added to their PATH environment variable. We had to come up with a better way.

We decided that we’d update the PATH environment variable to point to the tool in use, at the time the tool being used launched an application, launched a batch file, attached to a running application, or started working with a service. This way, only the application being monitored has it’s PATH updated, and it only has it’s PATH updated with the path to the tool in use, not all tools that have been installed. It’s elegant. It results in path isolation, so incompatible DLLs for one tool can’t affect another tool. And the user’s PATH environment variable doesn’t get polluted with lots of PATHs to our tools.

OK, so that sounds easy to do. Is it? Not exactly. There are quite a few use cases we need to cover. Some are trivial to implement, other quite involved. For all of the cases listed below we need to be able to handle:

  • 32 bit tool working with 32 bit application.
  • 64 bit tool working with 32 bit application.
  • 64 bit tool working with 64 bit application.

We made a grid of everything we needed to test, in every combination of tool (32 bit / 64 bit) and launch/batch/inject/service (32 bit and 64 bit). It came to 140 separate tests cases, each with it’s own test peculiarities, often requiring new and inventive ways to address the problem. When working through the services section we had to reboot a few times as we managed to get the service manager into a rather confused state :-).

Why does the PATH matter so much?

The reason the PATH matters so much is because when you’re injecting a DLL into another process so that you can gather information (flow tracing, code coverage, memory allocations, profiling, thread analysis) the DLL you’re injecting almost certainly has dependencies on other DLLs. If those dependencies can’t be satisfied by being found on the DLL loader search path, the DLL won’t load.

The reason we used to store the DLLs in system32 (or sysWow64) is because it’s an easy (and lazy) way to get the DLL dependencies found.

However, if we can modify the PATH suitably, we can ensure the DLLs can still be found.

Launching native (unmanaged) applications

This is when we start a typical application built using C, C++, Delphi, Visual Basic etc.

We modify the PATH in the tool prior to launching the target application. The target application inherits the environment variables of the parent process (the tool launching it).

Launching .Net (managed) applications

This is when we start a typical application built using C#, Visual Basic .Net etc.

We modify the PATH in the tool prior to launching the target application. The target application inherits the environment variables of the parent process (the tool launching it).

Launching applications from batch files

This is when we start an application from a batch file.

We modify the PATH in the tool prior to launching the target application. The target application inherits the environment variables of the parent process (the tool launching it).

This method will work for most use cases. If only life were that simple…

Launching applications from batch files with no path

This is when we start an application from a batch file but the creator of the batch file has explicitly modified the PATH environment variable, nullifying any changes we made to the PATH environment variable when we launched the command processor that is executing the batch file.

We need to intercept where the command processor starts the process and then modify the PATH in the environment block passed to the target application.

Launching applications from other applications

This is where we monitor the Nth application launched by another application.

We need to intercept where the first application starts the process we wish to monitor and then modify the PATH in the environment block passed to the target application.

Attaching to running applications

This is where we need to inject our DLL (which is in a known location that is not in the PATH) into the address space of a running process that already has the PATH environment variable set, most likely without including a path to where our DLL (and it’s dependencies) is located. The key is the fact that the injected DLL has dependencies. If the dependencies can’t be found, the DLL load will fail.

We had to invent a way to modify the PATH in the already running application before we inject our DLL with all it’s dependencies.

Working with services

This is where we need to get our DLL loaded by the tool’s NT Service API (each Validator has it’s own NT Service API).

This isn’t as straightforward as it seems. The path to the DLL isn’t known (the user could have installed the Validator anywhere). We have to find a way to get the PATH information into the service so that the various NT Service APIs can load the DLL from the correct location. To do this we also updated all the NT Service APIs with additional functions to help debug any NT Service API failures. A separate blog post covers this topic. Services run in quite locked down environments, getting this information into each service was quite an interesting adventure.

Changes to installer and Validators

The way our software tools are written you can normally install one version over the top of a previous version without needing to uninstall the previous version. For this next release, with the new DLL layout, we recommend uninstalling the previous version. However this is not essential as we have added some code to the licence key installer and also to the main Validator user interface, code that will check for the existence of Software Verify DLLs in the Windows system32 directory. If Software Verify DLLs are found in this directory, you will be informed and offered the ability to remove these DLLs.

We recommend removing the DLLs, as we cannot predict the interaction between DLLs left in the system32 directory and the new version of the Validator software. It is possible that for most, if not all, use cases that the software will function correctly. This depends on the way the Windows DLL Loader searches for DLLs and how it loads DLLs. If the system32 directory DLLs are found first then the wrong DLLs will be loaded. This is why we recommend removing them.

“But if I delete the svl*.* files in system32, won’t my older tools stop working?”

Older versions of our software tools will continue to work. Every time you start the GUI for an older tool, it will copy the DLLs it needs back into system32 so that it can function. Then, the next time you start a modern tool, you’ll get a prompt about the svl*.* files and have the option to delete them. With both solutions, the tools keep working. However, if you have an anti-virus tool (for example, BitDefender) installed, that will then delete those files, preventing the tool from working. That’s why the new mechanism is better, the tools work and anti-virus tools are happy.

The above scenario isn’t ideal, but it will allow older and newer tools to work together. If this is a serious issue for some people we may add an “always delete the files” option so that subsequent starts of the newer tools automatically delete the svl*.* files from system32. If you need this functionality, please let us know.

We believe the current versions of our tools are better than the older versions and that upgrading to the current versions will provide a better experience, both in functionality, better user experience, and better documentation. This is the 2nd time in our company history (nearly 16 years) that we’ve chosen to make a non-backwards compatible change with previous behaviour (excluding changes to saved data file formats).

Summary

We’ve changed how we install our software. We no longer do things that might alarm anti-virus tools. As a user of our software, you shouldn’t notice any change in functionality. Everything should continue working as normal.

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Changes to the NT Service API

By , February 3, 2018 10:25 am

All of our Validator tools have an NT Service API.

We’ve just made some changes to the NT Service API. This article documents those changes and why we made them.

The changes to the NT Service API, break the existing API behaviour, and improve the existing API behaviour.

If you are using the NT Service API, you should read this article.

For the purposes of this article I’m going to describe the NT Service API for C++ Memory Validator. The changes apply to the NT Service APIs for each C++ Validator tool, the only thing that is different is the function name prefix of svlBVStub_, svlCVStub_, svlMVStub_, svlPVStub_, svlTVStub_. If you can’t directly use the NT Service API due to compiler/linker issues, please consult the documentation for your Validator to see an alternative way of getting the same result.

Changes to the API

  • We changed the name of an enumeration and extended the values in the enumeration.
  • We split some functions into two parts so that they could be reused with other functions to achieve a better result.
  • We added some debugging functions to help you debug any failures when using the API.

SVL_SERVICE_ERROR

The SVL_ERROR enumeration has been renamed to SVL_SERVICE_ERROR.

The definition for SVL_SERVICE_ERROR is now in it’s own include file svlServiceError.h rather than defined in the NT Service API header file (svlMVStubService.h for C++ Memory Validator).

typedef enum _svlServiceError
{
   SVL_OK,                              // Normal behaviour
   SVL_ALREADY_LOADED,                  // Stub DLL already loaded into service
   SVL_LOAD_FAILED,                     // Failed to load stub DLL into service
   SVL_FAILED_TO_ENABLE_STUB_SYMBOLS,   // Loaded DLL, but failed to enable stub symbols because couldn't find function
   SVL_NOT_LOADED,                      // Couldn't unload DLL because DLL not loaded
   SVL_FAIL_UNLOAD,                     // Couldn't unload DLL because couldn't find function
   SVL_FAIL_TO_CLEANUP_INTERNAL_HEAP,   // Couldn't get the internal stub heap and thus couldn't clean it up
   SVL_FAIL_MODULE_HANDLE               // Couldn't get the stub DLL handle so couldn't continue
   SVL_FAIL_SETSERVICECALLBACK,         // Couldn't call the set service callback
   SVL_FAIL_COULD_NOT_FIND_ENTRY_POINT, // Couldn't find the DLL entry point to start the validator
   SVL_FAIL_TO_START                    // Failed to start the Validator
} SVL_SERVICE_ERROR;

Split functionality

The previous implementation of svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator() and svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator6432() would load the Validator DLL, then start the Validator profiling the service.

The new implementation of svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator() and svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator6432() just loads the Validator DLL. It does not start the Validator profiling the service.

The reason for this change is that we wanted to allow the ability to set a service manager callback so that the service control manager could be informed about a long running instrumentation phase as the Validator is started. This is important because a delay of more than 10 seconds will cause the service control manager to kill the service.

To set the service callback call the svlMVStub_SetServiceCallback() function.

Then start the Validator with svlMVStub_StartMemoryValidator().

Loading, Starting, Unloading the Validator

To control the loading, starting and unloading of the Validator into the service, use these functions.

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator6432();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_StartMemoryValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_UnloadMemoryValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_SetServiceCallback(serviceCallback_FUNC callback,
                                                          void*                userParam);

svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator();

To load the Validator DLL into a 32 bit service when you are working with a 32 bit Validator, or to load the Validator DLL into a 64 bit service when you are working with a 64 bit Validator, use svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator().

svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator6432

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator6432();

To load the Validator DLL into a 32 bit service when you are working with a 64 bit Validator, use svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator6432().

svlMVStub_SetServiceCallback

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_SetServiceCallback(serviceCallback_FUNC callback,
                                                          void*                userParam);

Once you have successfully loaded the Validator DLL you can setup a service callback so that the service control manager can be kept updated during the process of starting the Validator.

When a service is starting, Windows requires the service to inform the Service Control Manager (SCM) that is starting at least every ten seconds. Failure to do so results in Windows concluding that the service has failed to start, and the service is terminated. Instrumenting your service may take more than 10 seconds, depending on the complexity and size of your service.

The solution is for the Validator to periodically call a user supplied callback from which you can regularly inform the SCM of the appropriate status.

Here is an example callback which ignores the userParam.

   void serviceCallback(void   *userParam)
   {
       static DWORD dwCheckPoint = 1;
   
       ssStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS;
       ssStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = 0;

       ssStatus.dwControlsAccepted = 0;
      
       ssStatus.dwCurrentState = dwCurrentState;
       ssStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = dwWin32ExitCode;
       ssStatus.dwWaitHint = dwWaitHint;
      
       ssStatus.dwCheckPoint = dwCheckPoint++;
      
       // Report the status of the service to the service control manager.

       return SetServiceStatus(sshStatusHandle, &ssStatus);
   }

svlMVStub_StartMemoryValidator

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_StartMemoryValidator();

Once you have successfully loaded the Memory Validator DLL you can start the Validator inspecting the service by calling svlMVStub_StartMemoryValidator().

svlMVStub_UnloadMemoryValidator

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_UnloadMemoryValidator();

To unload the Validator DLL from your service call svlMVStub_UnloadMemoryValidator(), do not call FreeLibrary(). svlMVStub_UnloadMemoryValidator() shuts down various communications threads and removes any hooks that the Validator may have installed.

Debugging functions

We have added the following debugging functions to the NT Service API.

Before using these functions you must first set the log file name, otherwise the other debugging functions will do nothing.

The log file is opened for each write to the log file then closed afterwards. As such these log file functions are slow. Do not use these functions in any performance sensitive task. They are intended to allow you get debugging information out of a service when you’re trying to work out why something isn’t working, should you have problems.

extern "C" void svlMVStub_setLogFileName(const wchar_t* fileName);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_deleteLogFile();

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFileA(const char* text);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFileW(const wchar_t* text);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFile(SVL_SERVICE_ERROR errCode);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFileLastError(DWORD errCode);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_dumpPathToLogFile();

svlMVStub_setLogFileName

To use any of the following logging functions you first need to set the name of the filename used for logging.
Setting this filename also sets the filename used by some of these API functions – you will find additional logging data from those functions that will help debug any issues with the service.

extern "C" void svlMVStub_setLogFileName(const wchar_t* fileName);

svlMVStub_deleteLogFile

extern "C" void svlMVStub_deleteLogFile();

This function deletes the log file.

svlMVStub_writeToLogFileA

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFileA(const char* text);

Call this function to write a standard ANSI character string to the log file.

svlMVStub_writeToLogFileW

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFileW(const wchar_t* text);

Call this function to write a unicode character string to the log file. The characters are cast to ANSI prior to writing. As such you can’t write Korean to the log file. This is simply a convenience function to write wide characters as simply as ANSI characters.

svlMVStub_writeToLogFile

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFile(SVL_SERVICE_ERROR errCode);

Call this function to write a human readable description of the SVL_SERVICE_ERROR error code to the log file.

svlMVStub_writeToLogFileLastError

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFileLastError(DWORD errCode);

Call this function to write a human readable description of the Windows error code to the log file.

svlMVStub_dumpPathToLogFile

extern "C" void svlMVStub_dumpPathToLogFile();

Call this function to write the contents of the PATH environment variable to the log file. This can be useful if you want to know what the search path is when trying to debug why a DLL wasn’t found during an attempt to load the Validator DLL.

NT Service API for each Validator

C++ Bug Validator

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlBVStub_LoadBugValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlBVStub_LoadBugValidator6432();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlBVStub_StartBugValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlBVStub_UnloadBugValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlBVStub_SetServiceCallback(serviceCallback_FUNC callback,
                                                          void*                userParam);

// debugging functions

extern "C" void svlBVStub_setLogFileName(const wchar_t* fileName);

extern "C" void svlBVStub_deleteLogFile();

extern "C" void svlBVStub_writeToLogFileA(const char* text);

extern "C" void svlBVStub_writeToLogFileW(const wchar_t* text);

extern "C" void svlBVStub_writeToLogFile(SVL_SERVICE_ERROR errCode);

extern "C" void svlBVStub_writeToLogFileLastError(DWORD errCode);

extern "C" void svlBVStub_dumpPathToLogFile();

C++ Coverage Validator

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlCVStub_LoadCoverageValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlCVStub_LoadCoverageValidator6432();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlCVStub_StartCoverageValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlCVStub_UnloadCoverageValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlCVStub_SetServiceCallback(serviceCallback_FUNC callback,
                                                          void*                userParam);

extern "C" void svlCVStub_setLogFileName(const wchar_t* fileName);

extern "C" void svlCVStub_deleteLogFile();

extern "C" void svlCVStub_writeToLogFileA(const char* text);

extern "C" void svlCVStub_writeToLogFileW(const wchar_t* text);

extern "C" void svlCVStub_writeToLogFile(SVL_SERVICE_ERROR errCode);

extern "C" void svlCVStub_writeToLogFileLastError(DWORD errCode);

extern "C" void svlCVStub_dumpPathToLogFile();

C++ Memory Validator

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_LoadMemoryValidator6432();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_StartMemoryValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_UnloadMemoryValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlMVStub_SetServiceCallback(serviceCallback_FUNC callback,
                                                          void*                userParam);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_setLogFileName(const wchar_t* fileName);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_deleteLogFile();

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFileA(const char* text);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFileW(const wchar_t* text);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFile(SVL_SERVICE_ERROR errCode);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_writeToLogFileLastError(DWORD errCode);

extern "C" void svlMVStub_dumpPathToLogFile();

C++ Performance Validator

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlPVStub_LoadPerformanceValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlPVStub_LoadPerformanceValidator6432();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlPVStub_StartPerformanceValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlPVStub_UnloadPerformanceValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlPVStub_SetServiceCallback(serviceCallback_FUNC callback,
                                                          void*                userParam);

extern "C" void svlPVStub_setLogFileName(const wchar_t* fileName);

extern "C" void svlPVStub_deleteLogFile();

extern "C" void svlPVStub_writeToLogFileA(const char* text);

extern "C" void svlPVStub_writeToLogFileW(const wchar_t* text);

extern "C" void svlPVStub_writeToLogFile(SVL_SERVICE_ERROR errCode);

extern "C" void svlPVStub_writeToLogFileLastError(DWORD errCode);

extern "C" void svlPVStub_dumpPathToLogFile();

C++ Thread Validator

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlTVStub_LoadThreadValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlTVStub_LoadThreadValidator6432();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlTVStub_StartThreadValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlTVStub_UnloadThreadValidator();

extern "C" SVL_SERVICE_ERROR svlTVStub_SetServiceCallback(serviceCallback_FUNC callback,
                                                          void*                userParam);

extern "C" void svlTVStub_setLogFileName(const wchar_t* fileName);

extern "C" void svlTVStub_deleteLogFile();

extern "C" void svlTVStub_writeToLogFileA(const char* text);

extern "C" void svlTVStub_writeToLogFileW(const wchar_t* text);

extern "C" void svlTVStub_writeToLogFile(SVL_SERVICE_ERROR errCode);

extern "C" void svlTVStub_writeToLogFileLastError(DWORD errCode);

extern "C" void svlTVStub_dumpPathToLogFile();
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List of UK stock trading websites that are not secure by default

By , December 19, 2017 12:06 pm

This is one of several posts of the topic of security of websites. Inspired by my initial post on the security of UK banks.

The reason for splitting this data into multiple posts is to make it more manageable. So that data on one institution is not mixed with data on another type of institution.

I thought it would be interesting to look at each bank in the UK to see if when you visit their company homepage, is that secure by default? That is, is the page loaded by HTTPS? There are more tests than this that you could do, but that’s the baseline. If they can’t meet that then the other tests are meaningless.

Some banks provide the website in both http and https versions. This is bad practice. If someone visits the website as http then the customer should be served the https version of the page.

Also please note, these test results are for a desktop computer visiting the website. A mobile phone may well get a different experience. In other words desktop visitors may get a secure site, but mobile visitors might not. Or vice versa.

The following key is used for the secure status:

Yes The site is secure, loaded via https
Dual The site can be loaded via http, or via https.
Invalid The site loads via https, but the security certificate is invalid and thus the site is insecure.
Partial The site loads via https, but loads some parts of the page without https. The site is insecure.
No The site is loaded via http, not via https.
Fixed The site is loaded via https, but at the time of first writing it was loaded via http.
?? We could not find a website to evaluate.

We tested 66 stock trading websites, most of them based in the UK. We found 20 stock trading websites that did not have a secure home page (not https or did have https with an invalid security certificate). That is 30% of stock trading websites have security vulnerabilities.

Stock Trader Secure Home Page
Alliance Trust Saving Yes https://atonline.alliancetrust.co.uk/atonline/login.jsp
ANZ Yes https://shareinvesting.anz.com/home.aspx
Angel Broking No http://www.angelbroking.com/online-share-trading
Bank of Scotland Yes https://www.bankofscotland.co.uk/
Barclays Yes https://www.smartinvestor.barclays.co.uk/campaign/investment-account.html
Barclays Trading Hub Yes https://www.barclaystradinghub.co.uk/home/what-is-cfd-trading/spread-trading-versus-contracts-for-difference.html
Beaufort Securities Yes https://www.beaufortsecurities.com/online-share-dealing-t-14
Belforfx No http://bonus.belforfx.com
Broker Direct Yes https://www.brokerdirect.co.uk/News/ShareTradingNew.aspx
Charles Schwab No http://www.schwab.co.uk/public/schwab-uk-en/us-investing
Charles Stanley Direct Yes https://www.charles-stanley-direct.co.uk
Citi Yes https://www.citibank.co.uk/personal/equities.do
City Index Yes https://www.cityindex.co.uk/share-trading/
CMC Markets Yes https://www.cmcmarkets.com/en-au/markets-shares
Computershare Yes https://www.computershare.trade/
Degiro Yes https://www.degiro.co.uk/
Digital Look No http://www.digitallook.com
Direct Market Touch Yes https://www.directmarkettouch.com/
Etoro Yes https://www.etoro.com/
Easy Share Trading Yes https://easysharetrading.co.uk/stocks-and-shares-courses/
ETrade Yes https://us.etrade.com/home
ETX Capital Yes https://www.etxcapital.co.uk/equities-trading
Equiniti share view No http://www.shareview.co.uk/4/Info/Portfolio/Default/en/Home/Pages/Home.aspx
Fair Investment Company No http://www.fairinvestment.co.uk/uk_share_trading.aspx
Fantasy Stock Exchange No http://www.fantasystockexchange.biz/
FCMB Group Plc No http://fcmbgroup.com/share-trading-policy
First Direct No http://www1.firstdirect.com/1/2/savings-and-investments/sharedealing
Fortrade Yes https://www.fortrade.com/
Free Trade Yes https://freetrade.io/
FxPro Yes https://www.fxpro.co.uk/trading/shares
Get Stocks Yes https://getstocks.com
Halifax Yes https://www.halifax.co.uk/sharedealing/our-accounts/share-dealing-account/Default.asp
Hargreaves Lansdown No http://www.hl.co.uk/investment-services/fund-and-share-account
HSBC Yes https://investments.hsbc.co.uk/product/9/sharedealing
IG Yes https://www.ig.com/uk/shares
Interactive investor No http://www.iii.co.uk/
Internaxx Yes https://www.internaxx.com/
iDealing Yes https://www.idealing.com/en/index
iWeb No http://www.iweb-sharedealing.co.uk/share-dealing-home.asp
Lloyds Bank Yes https://www.lloydsbank.com/share-dealing/share-dealing-account.asp
London Capital Group Yes https://www.lcg.com/uk/
London South East No http://www.lse.co.uk/share-trading/
Natwest Invest Yes https://personal.natwest.com/personal/investments/natwest_invest/natwest-invest.html
Plus 500 Yes https://www.plus500.co.uk/Trading/Stocks
Redmayne Bentley Yes https://www.redmayne.co.uk/stockbroking
Religare broking No http://www.religareonline.com/
RHB Trade Smart Yes https://rhbtradesmart.com/
Saga share direct Yes http://www.sagasharedirect.co.uk/
Saxo Capital Markets Yes https://www.home.saxo/en-gb
Self Trade Yes https://selftrade.co.uk/
Shareprices.com Yes https://shareprices.com/trading/
Share Scope Yes https://www.sharescope.co.uk/
Stock Trade No http://www.stocktrade.co.uk/
Sure Trader Yes https://www.suretrader.com/
SVS XO Yes https://svsxo.com/
The share centre Yes https://www.share.com/share-account/
Westpac Yes https://www.westpac.com.au/personal-banking/investments/share-trading/
UAEXChange No http://www.uaeexchange-etrade.com/
UK Trading View Yes https://uk.tradingview.com/
Virgin Money Yes https://uk.virginmoney.com/virgin/isa/stocks-and-shares/#
Which Way To Pay No http://www.whichwaytopay.com/compare-share-dealing-summary.asp
XM Yes https://www.xm.co.uk/
XO No http://www.x-o.co.uk/
XTB Yes https://www.xtb.com/en
Yorkshire Building Society No http://sharedealing.ybs.co.uk/
You Invest Yes https://www.youinvest.co.uk/dealing-account

Charles Schwab & First Direct

First Direct were the first bank without a bank branch in the UK. That is they’ve always been online only. But their website is not secure by default. It is vulnerable to a man in the middle attack.

Charles Schwab was one of the very first share trading sites aimed at making share trading easy, even for non-experts. As such they’ve been around for a long time. But their website is not secure by default. It is vulnerable to a man in the middle attack.

Just because a business is established, that doesn’t mean you can trust their security.

Fantasy Stock Exchange

Fantasy Stock Exchange is website where children can go to trade pretend stocks and shares. To understand what is happening without any financial risks. It’s an interesting idea. But it’s not secure by default. Anything where children are involved I’d like to think that is secure, we read enough unpleasant stuff about grooming in other environments without their accounts being at risk as well.

Insecure Login

Most of these insecure websites are secure when you try to login, but not secure on the homepage. That makes them vulnerable to a man in the middle attack. However, one stock trading site, Digital Look, is completely insecure, even the login page is not secure, and has a remember me option!


Insecure Browser Extension

Another website was so problematic that we could not visit the website without being forced to install a chrome extension, that was allegedly to improve our security while using their site. The problems with this is are numerous:

  • The extension is downloaded from a non-disclosed location (you can’t see where it’s downloaded from, a website name briefly flashes past that is not destination website).
  • The extension is download from a non-secure location. Thus it could be anything.
  • You can’t verify anything about the extension before installing it in Chrome.
  • Whether you choose to install an extension in order to view a website should be a choice, not mandatory.

We were going to name this company, but when we later tried to reproduce this to get some screenshots of this dangerous chrome extension behaviour could not be repeated. If you see behaviour like this with a website please let us know.

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List of UK Insurance companies that are not secure by default

By , December 18, 2017 8:04 pm

This is one of several posts of the topic of security of websites. Inspired by my initial post on the security of UK banks.

The reason for splitting this data into multiple posts is to make it more manageable. So that data on one institution is not mixed with data on another type of institution.

I thought it would be interesting to look at each bank in the UK to see if when you visit their company homepage, is that secure by default? That is, is the page loaded by HTTPS? There are more tests than this that you could do, but that’s the baseline. If they can’t meet that then the other tests are meaningless.

Some banks provide the website in both http and https versions. This is bad practice. If someone visits the website as http then the customer should be served the https version of the page.

Also please note, these test results are for a desktop computer visiting the website. A mobile phone may well get a different experience. In other words desktop visitors may get a secure site, but mobile visitors might not. Or vice versa.

The following key is used for the secure status:

Yes The site is secure, loaded via https
Dual The site can be loaded via http, or via https.
Invalid The site loads via https, but the security certificate is invalid and thus the site is insecure.
Partial The site loads via https, but loads some parts of the page without https. The site is insecure.
No The site is loaded via http, not via https.
Fixed The site is loaded via https, but at the time of first writing it was loaded via http.
?? We could not find a website to evaluate.

We tested 23 insurance companies. We found 7 insurance companies that did not have a secure home page (not https or did have https with an invalid security certificate). That is 30% of UK insurance companies have security vulnerabilities.

Insurance Company Secure Home Page
AEGON UK Yes https://www.aegon.co.uk/index.html
AXA Yes https://www.axa.co.uk/home.aspx
Allianz SE Yes https://www.allianz.com/en/
Aviva Yes https://www.aviva.co.uk/
Direct Line Insurance Yes https://www.directline.com/
FM Global Yes https://www.fmglobal.com/
Hiscox Yes https://www.hiscox.co.uk/
Legal & General Yes https://www.legalandgeneral.com/insurance/
NFU Mutual Yes https://www.nfumutual.co.uk/
Old Mutual No http://www.oldmutualplc.com/
Phoenix No http://www.phoenixlife.co.uk/
Prudential No http://www.prudential.co.uk/
QBE Insurance Yes https://www.group.qbe.com/
Royal London Asset Management Yes https://www.rlam.co.uk/
Royal London Group Yes https://www.royallondon.com/
RSA Insurance Group Yes https://www.rsagroup.com/
Standard Life Yes https://www.standardlife.com/dotcom/index.page
Southern Rock Insurance No http://www.sricl.com/
XL Group No http://xlgroup.com/
Zurich Insurance Yes https://www.zurich.co.uk/

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List of UK pension funds that are not secure by default

By , December 18, 2017 4:01 pm

This is one of several posts of the topic of security of websites. Inspired by my initial post on the security of UK banks.

The reason for splitting this data into multiple posts is to make it more manageable. So that data on one institution is not mixed with data on another type of institution.

I thought it would be interesting to look at each bank in the UK to see if when you visit their company homepage, is that secure by default? That is, is the page loaded by HTTPS? There are more tests than this that you could do, but that’s the baseline. If they can’t meet that then the other tests are meaningless.

Some banks provide the website in both http and https versions. This is bad practice. If someone visits the website as http then the customer should be served the https version of the page.

Also please note, these test results are for a desktop computer visiting the website. A mobile phone may well get a different experience. In other words desktop visitors may get a secure site, but mobile visitors might not. Or vice versa.

The following key is used for the secure status:

Yes The site is secure, loaded via https
Dual The site can be loaded via http, or via https.
Invalid The site loads via https, but the security certificate is invalid and thus the site is insecure.
Partial The site loads via https, but loads some parts of the page without https. The site is insecure.
No The site is loaded via http, not via https.
Fixed The site is loaded via https, but at the time of first writing it was loaded via http.
?? We could not find a website to evaluate.

We tested 28 pension funds. We found 8 pension funds that did not have a secure home page (not https or did have https with an invalid security certificate). That is 29% of UK pension funds have security vulnerabilities.

Pension Fund Secure Home Page
Aviva Staff Pension Scheme No http://www.avivastaffpensions.co.uk/retired/default.aspx
BAE Systems Pension Scheme Yes https://www.baesystemspensions.com/
Barclays Bank UK Retirement Fund Yes https://epa.towerswatson.com/accounts/barclays/
BBC Pension Trust Ltd No http://www.bbc.co.uk/mypension/join
BP Pension Fund Yes https://pensionline.bp.com/Homepage
British Airways Pension Scheme Yes https://www.mybapension.com/
British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme Yes https://www.bcsss-pension.org.uk/
British Steel Pension Scheme Yes https://www.bspensions.com/
BT Pension Scheme Yes https://www.btpensions.net/
Co-operative Group Pension Scheme (Pace) Yes https://pensions.coop.co.uk/
Electricity Supply Pension Scheme Yes https://megtpensions.com/contact-us/
Greater Manchester Pension Fund Yes https://www.gmpf.org.uk/
HBOS Final Salary Pension Scheme Yes https://www.lloydsbankinggrouppensions.com/
HSBC Bank UK Pension Scheme No http://www.futurefocus.staff.hsbc.co.uk/
ICI Pension Fund No http://www.icipensionfund.org.uk/
Lloyds TSB Group Pension Scheme Yes https://www.lloydsbankinggrouppensions.com/
Mineworkers Pension Scheme Yes https://www.mps-pension.org.uk/
National Grid UK Pension Scheme Yes https://www.nationalgridpensions.com/362/1320/welcome-to-the-national-grid-uk-pension-scheme-website
Railways Pension Scheme Yes https://www.railwayspensions.co.uk/
RBS Group Pension Fund Yes https://rbs.tbs.aon.com/
RBS Group Pensioner’s Association No http://rbsgpa.org.uk/
Rolls-Royce Pension Fund Yes https://www.rolls-roycepensions.com/Homepage
Royal Mail Pension Plan Yes https://www.royalmailpensionplan.co.uk/
Shell Contributory Pension Fund No http://pensions.shell.co.uk/scpf.html
Strathclyde Pension Fund Yes https://www.spfo.org.uk/
Universities Superannuation Scheme Yes https://www.uss.co.uk/
West Midlands Pension Fund No http://www.wmpfonline.com/
West Yorkshire Pension Scheme No http://www.wypf.org.uk/

Commentary

It is surprising to see the pension funds of some banks are insecure, even though the banking website for it’s customers are secure.

While I find it very worrying that some banks and wealth managers etc are not secure, people whose funds are in a pension, that is often their only form of income, thus if access to the pension fund become compromised for a particular person, that could be all their future income being erased. This is not a pleasing prospect. As with banks, wealth managers, etc, these pension funds should manage their security with greater care and diligence.

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List of UK healthcare companies that are not secure by default

By , December 15, 2017 3:53 pm

This is one of several posts of the topic of security of websites. Inspired by my initial post on the security of UK banks.

The reason for splitting this data into multiple posts is to make it more manageable. So that data on one institution is not mixed with data on another type of institution.

The following key is used for the secure status:

Yes The site is secure, loaded via https
Dual The site can be loaded via http, or via https.
Invalid The site loads via https, but the security certificate is invalid and thus the site is insecure.
Partial The site loads via https, but loads some parts of the page without https. The site is insecure.
No The site is loaded via http, not via https.
Fixed The site is loaded via https, but at the time of first writing it was loaded via http.
?? We could not find a website to evaluate.

We tested 24 healthcare companies. We found 2 healthcare companies that did not have a secure home page (not https or did have https with an invalid security certificate). That is 8% of UK healthcare companies have security vulnerabilities.

Healthcare company Secure Home Page
Aviva Healthcare Yes https://www.aviva.co.uk/
AXA PPP Yes https://www.axappphealthcare.co.uk/
Benenden Healthcare Society Yes https://www.benenden.co.uk/
Birmingham Hospital Saturday Fund Yes https://www.bhsf.co.uk/
Bupa Yes https://www.bupa.co.uk/
CS Healthcare Yes https://www.cshealthcare.co.uk/
Engage Mutual Assurance Yes https://www.onefamily.com/
Exeter Family Friendly Yes https://www.the-exeter.com/
General & Medical Healthcare Yes https://www.generalandmedical.com/
Health-on-Line Yes https://www.health-on-line.co.uk/
Healthshield Yes https://www.healthshield.co.uk/
HSF Yes https://www.hsf.co.uk
Insurety No http://www.april-uk.com
Medicash Yes https://www.medicash.org
National Friendly Yes https://nationalfriendly.co.uk/
Saga Dual http://www.saga.co.uk
Secure Health Yes https://www.securehealth.co.uk/
Sovereign Health Yes https://www.sovereignhealthcare.co.uk/
Simply Health Yes https://www.simplyhealth.co.uk/
Vitality Yes https://www.vitality.co.uk/
Westfield Yes https://www.westfieldhealth.com/
WHA Yes https://www.whahealthcare.co.uk/
WHCA Yes https://www.orchardhealthcare.co.uk/
WPA Yes https://www.wpa.org.uk/

Commentary

Saga’s website is avialable via http and via https. This should be https only.

Disclaimer

I shouldn’t need to point this out, but i will, all the same, just to be clear.

The data provided on this page should taken at face value. If you’re not sure about something, please verify it yourself. Nothing reported here should be regarded as a criticism or an endorsement or recommendation of an organisations security effectiveness. I am simply passing comment on whether the home page (whatever that may be) is provided as https on not. Other security concerns are a separate matter.

If your organisation is listed here and is not marked as secure, your best course of action is to fix that, not to complain that someone is reporting a fact anyone with a web browser can discover. The security status of your home page is public information, albeit information that many people don’t understand.

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List of ecommerce platforms that are not secure by default

By , December 15, 2017 3:33 pm

This is one of several posts of the topic of security of websites. Inspired by my initial post on the security of UK banks.

The reason for splitting this data into multiple posts is to make it more manageable. So that data on one institution is not mixed with data on another type of institution.

The following key is used for the secure status:

Yes The site is secure, loaded via https
Dual The site can be loaded via http, or via https.
Invalid The site loads via https, but the security certificate is invalid and thus the site is insecure.
Partial The site loads via https, but loads some parts of the page without https. The site is insecure.
No The site is loaded via http, not via https.
Fixed The site is loaded via https, but at the time of first writing it was loaded via http.
?? We could not find a website to evaluate.

We tested 63 ecommerce companies. We found 9 ecommerce companies that did not have a secure home page (not https or did have https with
an invalid security certificate). That is 14% of ecommerce companies have security vulnerabilities.

Ecommerce company Secure Home Page
2C2P Yes https://www.2c2p.com/
Adyen Yes https://www.adyen.com/
Alipay Yes https://intl.alipay.com/
Amazon Pay Yes https://pay.amazon.com/uk
Apple Pay Yes https://www.apple.com/uk/apple-pay/
Atos Yes https://atos.net/en-gb/united-kingdom
Authorize.Net Yes https://www.authorize.net/
Bambora Yes https://www.bambora.com/sv/overview/#market-select
BitPay Yes https://bitpay.com/
BPAY Yes https://www.bpay.co.uk/
Braintree Yes https://www.braintreepayments.com/en-gb
CM Telecom Yes https://www.cm.com/
Creditcall Yes https://www.creditcall.com/
CyberSource Yes https://www.cybersource.com/en-EMEA/
DigiCash Yes https://www.digi.cash/
Digital River Yes https://www.digitalriver.com/
Dwolla Yes https://www.dwolla.com/
Elavon Yes https://www.elavon.co.uk/index.html
Euronet Worldwide No http://www.euronetworldwide.com/
eWAY Yes https://eway.io/uk
First Data Yes https://www.firstdata.com/en_gb/home.html
Flooz Yes https://www.flooz.me/
Fortumo Online Yes https://fortumo.com/
GoCardless Yes https://gocardless.com/
Heartland Payment Systems Yes https://www.heartlandpaymentsystems.com/about-us
Ingenico Yes https://www.ingenico.com/
Klarna Yes https://www.klarna.com/uk/
ModusLink Yes https://www.moduslink.com/
MPay No http://www.mpay.al/en
Neteller Yes https://www.neteller.com/en/
Nochex Yes https://www.nochex.com/gb/
OFX Yes https://www.ofx.com/en-gb/
PagSeguro Yes https://pagseguro.uol.com.br/
PayPal Yes https://www.paypal.com/uk/home
Payoneer Yes https://www.payoneer.com/main/
Paymentwall Yes https://www.paymentwall.com/en/
PayPoint Yes https://www.paypoint.com/en-gb/consumers/store-locator
Paysbuy Yes https://www.paysbuy.com/
Paysafe Group Yes https://www.paysafe.com/
PayStand No http://www.paystand.com/
Payzone Yes https://www.payzone.co.uk/
Qiwi Yes https://qiwi.com/
Realex Payments Yes https://www.realexpayments.com/uk/
Red Dot Payment No http://reddotpayment.com/
Sage Group Yes https://www.sage.com/en-gb/
Skrill Yes https://www.skrill.com/en/
Stripe Yes https://stripe.com/gb
Square Yes https://squareup.com/gb
SWREG Dual http://faq.swreg.org/
Tencent Yes https://www.tencent.com/en-us/
TIMWE No http://www.timwe.com/
TransferWise Yes https://transferwise.com/
True Money No http://www.truemoney.com/
Trustly Online Yes https://trustly.com/en/
Verifone No http://www.verifone.co.uk/
WebMoney Yes https://www.wmtransfer.com/
WeChat Pay Yes https://pay.weixin.qq.com/index.php/public/wechatpay
WePay Yes https://go.wepay.com/
Wirecard Yes https://www.wirecard.com/
Worldpay No http://www.worldpay.com
Xendpay Yes https://www.xendpay.com/
Xsolla Yes https://www.xsolla.com/
Yandex.Money Yes https://money.yandex.ru/

Commentary

I was surprised to see that WorldWay is not secure by default.

I was also surprised to see that SWREG, the oldest of all the ecommerce companies in the world, is also not secure by default. Longevity has no bearings on the operating standards of a business. Interestingly the company that now owns SWREG, Digital River is secure by default.

Disclaimer

I shouldn’t need to point this out, but i will, all the same, just to be clear.

The data provided on this page should taken at face value. If you’re not sure about something, please verify it yourself. Nothing reported here should be regarded as a criticism or an endorsement or recommendation of an organisations security effectiveness. I am simply passing comment on whether the home page (whatever that may be) is provided as https on not. Other security concerns are a separate matter.

If your organisation is listed here and is not marked as secure, your best course of action is to fix that, not to complain that someone is reporting a fact anyone with a web browser can discover. The security status of your home page is public information, albeit information that many people don’t understand.

Share

List of UK online casinos that are not secure by default

By , December 15, 2017 1:30 pm

This is one of several posts of the topic of security of websites. Inspired by my initial post on the security of UK banks.

The reason for splitting this data into multiple posts is to make it more manageable. So that data on one institution is not mixed with data on another type of institution.

The following key is used for the secure status:

Yes The site is secure, loaded via https
Invalid The site loads via https, but the security certificate is invalid and thus the site is
insecure.
Partial The site loads via https, but loads some parts of the page without https. The site is
insecure.
No The site is loaded via http, not via https.
Fixed The site is loaded via https, but at the time of first writing it was loaded via
http.
?? We could not find a website to evaluate.

We tested 75 online casinos. We found 12 online casinos that did not have a secure home page (not https or did have https with an invalid security certificate). That is 16% of UK online casinos have security vulnerabilities.

Casino Secure Home Page
21Jackpots No http://21jackpots.com/
32Red Casino Yes https://www.32red.com/
50 Stars Casino No http://www.50starscasino.com/english/eur/download.html
888Casino Yes https://www.888casino.com/
All British Casino Yes https://www.allbritishcasino.com/
All Irish Casino Yes https://www.allirishcasino.com/
BETAT Casino Yes https://betat.co.uk/home/
Betfred Casino No http://www.betfred.com/casino
Betsafe Casino Yes https://www.betsafe.com/en/casino
Betspin Casino Yes https://www.betspin.com/gb
Betway Casino Yes https://casino.betway.com/lobby/en/#/home
Bet-At-Home Casino Yes https://uk.bet-at-home.com/
bgo Vegas Yes https://www.bgo.com/
Cashmio Casino Yes https://www.cashmio.com/en
CasinoLuck Yes https://www.casinoluck.com/
Casino Kings Yes https://www.casinokings.com/
Casino Magix Yes https://www.casinomagix.com/
Casumo Casino Yes https://www.casumo.com/en-gb/
ComeOn Casino Yes https://www.comeon.com/
Carnival Casino No http://www.carnivalcasino.com/
Casino Cruise Yes https://www.casinocruise.com/en-gb
Casino King Yes https://www.casinokings.com/
Casino Plex No http://casinoplex.co.uk/
Casino Share No http://www.luxurycasino.co.uk/en-gb/
Casino Splendido Yes https://www.casinosplendido.com/
Casino.com Yes https://www.casino.com/uk/
Challenge Casino No http://www.luxurycasino.co.uk/en-gb/
Conquer Casino Yes https://www.conquercasino.com/
Cyber Club Casino Yes https://www.cyberclubcasino.com/
Dash Casino Yes https://www.dashcasino.com/
Dr Vegas Casino Yes https://www.drvegas.com/
Dream Palace Casino Yes https://www.dreampalacecasino.com/
EnergyCasino Yes https://energycasino.com/en/
FruityCasa Casino Yes https://www.fruitycasa.com/
Gala Casino Yes https://www.galacasino.com/
GameVillage Yes https://www.gamevillage.com/
Golden Lounge Casino No http://www.goldenlounge.com/
Grosvenor Casino Yes https://www.grosvenorcasinos.com/
Guts Casino Yes https://www.guts.com/gb/page/welcome
Intercasino Yes https://www.intercasino.co.uk/
Jackpot Luck Casino Yes https://www.jackpotluck.com/
Jetbull Casino Yes https://www.jetbull.com/
Karamba Casino Yes https://www.karamba.com/
Ladbrokes Casino No http://casino.ladbrokes.com/en
Magic Box Casino No http://www.magicboxcasino.com/
Mansion Casino Yes https://play.mansioncasino.com/
Maria Casino Yes https://www.mariacasino.co.uk/
mFortune Casino Yes https://www.mfortune.co.uk/
MobileWins Casino Yes https://www.mobilewins.co.uk/
Monte Carlo Casino No http://www.casinomontecarlo.com/
Moon Games Casino Yes https://www.moongames.com/
Mr Green Casino Yes https://www.mrgreen.com/en
Nedplay Casino Yes https://www.nedplay.com/
Noxwin Casino Yes https://www.noxwin.com/#/
Oddsring Casino Yes https://www.oddsring.com/home
Paddy Power Casino No http://casino.paddypower.com/
PokerStars Casino Yes https://www.pokerstarscasino.uk/
Power Slots Yes https://www.powerslots.eu/
Prospect Hall Casino Yes https://prospecthallcasino.com/games/index/
Spinit Casino Yes https://www.spinit.com/en
Redbet Casino Yes https://www.redbet.com/en/casino
Red Queen Casino Yes https://www.redqueencasino.com/
Rizk Casino Yes https://rizk.com/gb
Roxy Palace Casino Yes https://www.roxypalace.com/
Royal Swipe Casino Yes https://www.royalswipe.com/
SCasino Yes https://www.scasino.com/uk/
Sportingbet Casino Yes https://casino.sportingbet.com/en/casino
ShadowBet Casino Yes https://www.shadowbet.com/uk
Slotty Vegas Casino Yes https://slottyvegas.com/en/welcome/
Sporting Index Casino Yes https://casino.sportingindex.com/
Trada Casino Yes https://www.tradacasino.com/
Unibet Casino Yes https://www.unibet.co.uk/casino#filter:uk-unibet-picks-casino-slots-7-420439
Vegas Paradise Casino Yes https://www.vegasparadise.com/
VideoSlots Casino Yes https://www.videoslots.com/
William Hill Casino Yes https://casino.williamhill.com/#!/

Commentary

Reputation

Just as with wealth management, there are some big names in this list, that spend lots of money on advertising, and yet they are not secure. You cannot rely on a trusted brand name to mean that you get a secure website.

Downloading from a non secure site

One site in particular deserves a special mention. 50 Stars Casino. This is not secure, but for you to gamble with them you need to download a software package from their non-secure website and then install the software. I did download it. The download is digitally signed, but given that it’s downloading off a non-secure page, the download could, technically be anything, not necessarily the software the casino wants you to download. This is not good. Not only is the website not secure, but it could potentially attack your computer if the download is compromised.

Disclaimer

I shouldn’t need to point this out, but i will, all the same, just to be clear.

The data provided on this page should taken at face value. If you’re not sure about something, please verify it yourself. Nothing reported here should be regarded as a criticism or an endorsement or recommendation of an organisations security effectiveness. I am simply passing comment on whether the home page (whatever that may be) is provided as https on not. Other security concerns are a separate matter.

If your organisation is listed here and is not marked as secure, your best course of action is to fix that, not to complain that someone is reporting a fact anyone with a web browser can discover. The security status of your home page is public information, albeit information that many people don’t understand.

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